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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) will play a significant 
role in protecting employees and employers while reversing the 
massive work disruptions caused by COVID-19.1  The United States’ 
unemployment rate reflects the magnitude of the disruptions; the 
unemployment rate reached almost 15%, and over 43 million 
Americans filed unemployment claims during the first half of 2020.2  
Additionally, millions of Americans began working from home or 
otherwise altering their work routine to protect themselves and others 
from spreading the virus.3  Researchers and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) state that COVID-19 will likely become 
endemic to the United States’ population.4  The endemic presence of 
COVID-19 will create new ongoing legal obligations for employers under 
the ADA, which are explored in this paper.  
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to address the “serious and 
pervasive social problem” caused by society’s historical tendency to 
“isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities.”5  When the ADA was 
passed, “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and 
 
 1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.  The Americans with 
Disabilities Act is a landmark piece of civil rights legislation passed in 1990 and 
amended in 2009. 
 2 Sarah Chaney & Eric Morath, April Unemployment Rate Rose to a Record 14.7%, 
WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/april-jobs-report-
coronavirus-2020-11588888089; Anneken Tappe, Nearly 43 Million Americans Have 
Filed for Unemployment Benefits During the Pandemic, CNN BUS. (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/economy/unemployment-benefits-coronavirus/
index.html; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The 
Employment Situation: April 2020 (May 8, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.pdf. 
 3 May Wong, Stanford Research Provides a Snapshot of a New Working-From-Home 
Economy, STAN. NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://news.stanford.edu/2020/06/29/
snapshot-new-working-home-economy (estimating that 42% of the workforce was 
working from home in June 2020).   
 4 Ruiyun Li et al., Substantial Undocumented Infection Facilitates the Rapid 
Dissemination of the Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), 368 SCIENCE 489, 492 (2020), 
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/368/6490/489.full.pdf (noting that prior 
to COVID-19, there were already “four endemic coronavirus strains circulating in the 
human populations,” and “[i]f the novel coronavirus follows the pattern of 2009 H1N1 
pandemic influenza, it will also spread globally and become a fifth endemic coronavirus 
within the human population”); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PRINCIPLES 
OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY AND 
BIOSTATISTICS 72 (3d ed. 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/
section11.html (defining “endemic” as “the constant presence and/or usual prevalence 
of a disease or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area”). 
 5 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674–75 (2001). 
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fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as the physical 
limitations that flow from the actual impairment.”6   
Contagious diseases like COVID-19 are particularly problematic 
when it comes to employment discrimination.  Few physical 
impairments “give rise to the same level of public fear and apprehension 
as contagiousness.”7  The CDC notes regarding COVID-19 that “[f]ear and 
anxiety about a disease can lead to social stigma . . . toward people, 
places, or things.”8  For example, when discussing the case of a nurse 
quarantined after traveling to an area of an Ebola outbreak, one court 
noted, “Bad science and irrational fear often amplify the public’s 
reaction to reports of infectious disease” and added that “Ebola . . . is a 
virus, not a malevolent magic spell.”9   
Pandemics like the COVID-19 pandemic are not uncommon 
historically.  According to one historian, “Epidemics unfold as social 
dramas” that “start at a moment in time, proceed on a stage limited in 
space and duration, follow a plot line of increasing revelatory tension, 
move to a crisis of individual and collective character, then drift toward 
closure.”10  The “world has seen four influenza pandemics in the last 
century,” including (1) the “Spanish Flu” of 1918; (2) the “Asian” and 
“Hong Kong” Flus of the 1950s and 1960s; (3) the SARS outbreak in 
2003 (which was technically “considered a pandemic ‘scare’”); and (4) 
the H1N1 outbreak in 2009.11  The Spanish Flu of 1918 pandemic was 
the “most severe” and “killed 675,000 people in the United States and 
50 million people worldwide.”12  The World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020.13   
COVID-19 is caused by a coronavirus related to two other 
coronaviruses involved in previous outbreaks, including the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus outbreak in 2002–03 and the 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) virus outbreak still going on 
 
 6 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
 7 Id.  
 8 Reducing Stigma, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/reducing-stigma.html 
[hereinafter CDC, Reducing Stigma]. 
 9 Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D.N.J. 2016).  
 10 David S. Jones, History in a Crisis—Lessons for COVID-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1681 
(2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2004361. 
 11 Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (EEOC) [hereinafter EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness], 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemic-preparedness-workplace-and-
americans-disabilities-act (last visited September 5, 2020). 
 12 Id. at n.3.  
 13 Id.   
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from 2012.14  COVID-19 is caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).15  The WHO designated the 
disease caused by the virus as Coronavirus Disease 2019, or “COVID-
19,” in February 2020.16   
The COVID-19 virus is believed to spread from person-to-person 
mainly between people who are within about 6 feet of each other (i.e., 
in close contact) and via “respiratory droplets produced when an 
infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks.”17  Droplets “can land in the 
mouths or noses of people who are nearby or possibly be inhaled into 
the lungs.”18  The virus may be contagious before people show 
symptoms and can live on surfaces for spread from hand-to-face 
touching.19  People with COVID-19 carry the virus (i.e., are possibly 
contagious to others) for an average of twenty days and up to thirty-
seven days in some individuals.20   
The most common symptoms of COVID-19 for patients admitted to 
the hospital were fever and cough, followed by sputum production and 
fatigue.21  But even among hospitalized patients, these symptoms were 
not reliable indicators of infection since less than one-third of patients 
had a fever at the time of admission and less than one-fifth had an 
 
 14 Zunyou Wu & Jennifer McGoogan, Characteristics of and Important Lessons From 
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of a Report of 
72,314 Cases From the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 323(13) JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1239, 1239–41 (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/full
article/2762130. 
 15 Fei Zhou et al., Clinical Course and Risk Factors for Mortality of Adult Inpatients 
with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 395 LANCET 1054, 1054 
(2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930
566-3.   
 16 Id.  
 17 How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html 
(last updated July 31, 2020).  
 18 Id.   
 19 Id.   
 20 Zhou et al., supra note 15, at 1054, 1058 (noting that “[t]he shortest observed 
duration of viral shedding among survivors was 8 days, whereas the longest was 37 
days” and that the median was 20 days).   
 21 Id. 
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elevated respiratory rate.22  Hospitalized patients spend an average of 
three weeks in the hospital according to one study.23   
The severity of the illness varies greatly between individuals.  
COVID-19 symptoms range from asymptomatic infection to severe viral 
pneumonia with respiratory failure and death.24  No specific antiviral 
therapies have been identified to treat these viruses, so the treatment is 
supportive care.25   
Multiple factors have been found to relate to the severity of COVID-
19 cases and the risk of death or severe complications in particular 
individuals.  Older age is a risk factor for death.26  Comorbidities, like 
high blood pressure, diabetes, and coronary heart disease, were present 
in over half of patients in one early study of Chinese COVID-19 
patients.27  In a study of 5,700 New York patients, male sex, 
hypertension, obesity, and diabetes were also risk factors for 
hospitalization.28  On July 26, 2020, a total of 16,076,713 global cases 
had been reported, leading to 644,661 deaths in 188 
“countries/regions” for a case fatality rate of 4.0%.29  But, in the United 
States, the CDC estimates that the case fatality rate is around 0.4%.30  
 
 22 Safiya Richardson et al., Presenting Characteristics, Comorbidities, and Outcomes 
Among 5,700 Patients Hospitalized with COVID-19 in the New York City Area, 323(20) 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 2052, 2054 (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/full
article/2765184 (noting that at the time of hospitalization, only 30.7% of hospitalized 
patients had fevers and only 17.3% had an elevated respiratory rate over twenty-four 
breaths/minute).   
 23 Zhou et al., supra note 15, at 1057 (noting for hospitalized patients, “The median 
time from illness onset . . . to discharge [is] 22 days . . . .”).  
 24 Id. at 1054.   
 25 Wu & McGoogan, supra note 14, at 1241.   
 26 Zhou et al., supra note 15,  at 1054. 
 27 Id. at 1054.   
 28 Richardson et al., supra note 22, at 2052 (noting that that there was a male 
propensity (61.3% were male), 56% had hypertension, 41.7% were obese, and 33.8% 
had diabetes).   
 29 COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE), 
JOHN HOPKINS UNIV. [hereinafter COVID-19 Operations Dashboard], https://www.arcgis.
com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6 (last 
visited July 26, 2020).   
 30 COVID-19 Pandemic Planning Scenarios, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(CDC) (July 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planning-
scenarios-h.pdf [hereinafter CDC, Pandemic Planning] (see Scenario 5);Arman Azad, CDC 
Estimates that 35% of Coronavirus Patients Don’t Have Symptoms, CNN HEALTH (May 22, 
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/health/cdc-coronavirus-estimates-
symptoms-deaths/index.html (“The CDC also says its ‘best estimate’ is that 0.4% of 
people who show symptoms and have Covid-19 will die.”).  
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Others indicate that the United States’ case fatality rate may be more in-
line with that of seasonal influenza, which is 0.1%.31   
The above characteristics of COVID-19 will impact the legal 
analysis under the ADA.  The ADA provides the boundaries and 
framework to protect employers and employees in dealing with 
discrimination related to disabilities.32  The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Title I of the ADA and issues 
guidelines.33  But the EEOC Guidance does “not have the force and effect 
of law,” so throughout this Article I will rely on EEOC Guidance (which 
tends to be more specific to pandemic flu), as well as underlying case 
law, statutes, and regulations.34  This Article will discuss (1) whether 
and/or how populations of employees impacted by COVID-19 can be 
considered individuals with a “disability” protected by the ADA, and (2) 
how the ADA will help define the ways that employers and employees 
deal with COVID-19 as Americans go back to work.   
II.  COVID-19 AND “DISABILITY” UNDER THE ADA 
How employees and employers affected by COVID-19 are treated 
under the ADA hinges upon whether COVID-19 and/or COVID-19-
related impairments are considered “disabilities” under the ADA’s 
definition.  This Part will first explore the ADA’s treatment of some other 
communicable diseases.  Then, it will apply the ADA definition of 
“disability” to COVID-19.  Finally, this Part will explore a potential new 
group of “disabled” individuals under the ADA: those susceptible to life-
altering COVID-19 complications (including death).   
A.  Communicable Diseases as Disabilities 
Infectious and communicable diseases are disabilities under the 
ADA under some circumstances.35  The Supreme Court of the United 
 
 31 Anthony Fauci et al., Covid-19—Navigating the Uncharted, 382(13) NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1268, 1268 (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMe2002387 
(stating that “the overall clinical consequences of Covid-19 may ultimately be more akin 
to those of a severe seasonal influenza (which has a case fatality rate of approximately 
0.1%)”).   
 32 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2 (2019) (explaining, “Title I of the ADA prohibits 
disability-based discrimination in employment.”).   
 33 Id. (pointing out, “Pursuant to the ADA as amended, the EEOC is expressly granted 
the authority and is expected to amend these regulations. 42 U.S.C. 12205a.”). 
 34 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11 ( “The contents of this document do 
not have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This 
document is intended only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing 
requirements under the law or agency policies.”). 
 35 Sch. Bd. Of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (“Allowing 
discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment would be 
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States has recognized that allowing discrimination based on the 
contagiousness of a disease is inconsistent with the ADA’s basic purpose 
of ensuring that people with disabilities are “not denied . . . benefits 
because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.”36  The 
Court observed that “[e]ven those who suffer or have recovered from 
such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer have faced 
discrimination based on the irrational fear that they might 
be contagious.”37   
The Supreme Court has recognized infectious diseases—including 
tuberculosis (TB) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—as 
disabilities under the ADA.38  Tuberculosis was recognized as a 
disability by the Supreme Court in Arline.39  Ms. Gene Arline was first 
hospitalized for TB in 1957, but her disease subsequently went into 
remission for twenty years from 1957 to 1977.40  For thirteen years 
(from 1966 to 1979), Arline was an elementary school teacher in Nassau 
County, Florida.41  During the last two years of her employment, she 
experienced three relapses of TB.42  After positive TB cultures in 1977 
and 1978, she was suspended with pay for the remainder of the school 
year.43  The school board then fired Arline at the end of the school year, 
“not because she had done anything wrong” but because of the 
recurrence of her TB.44  In the aftermath, the Supreme Court held that “a 
 
inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504 [and the ADA], which is to ensure that 
handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced 
attitudes or the ignorance of others.”).   
 36 Id. (referring to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which Congress has made clear 
applies to the ADA, which adopted the Rehabilitation Act’s definitions); see also 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2 (2019) (noting that “Congress intended that the relevant case 
law developed under the Rehabilitation Act would be generally applicable to the term 
‘disability’ as used in the ADA.”).   
 37 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.  
 38 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C § 36.104 (“[S]ymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity; therefore, it has been included in the 
definition of disability under this part. . . . [A]symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity, either because of its actual effect on the 
individual with HIV disease or because the reactions of other people to individuals with 
HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated as though they are disabled.”); see also 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 647 (1998) (holding asymptomatic HIV infection to be 
a disability under the ADA). 
 39 Arline, 480 U.S. at 281. 
 40 Id. at 276. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.   
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:05 PM 
390 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:383 
person suffering from the contagious disease of tuberculosis can be a 
handicapped person” and that “Arline is such a person.”45   
In another prominent example, Bragdon recognized HIV as a 
disability.46  An asymptomatic HIV-positive patient sought to have a 
cavity filled by her dentist who refused to treat her in his office after she 
disclosed her HIV status on a patient registration form.47  The Supreme 
Court found that HIV infection is a disability under the ADA even before 
it causes symptoms.48 
Employers may not discriminate against qualified individuals with 
communicable diseases that fulfill the definition of “disability” under 
Title I of the ADA “on the basis of disability in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”49  The definition of discrimination includes:  
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or 
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or 
status of the applicant or employee . . . ;  
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or 
relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity’s 
qualified applicant or employee to discrimination . . . ;  
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or other methods of 
administration— 
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of 
disability . . . ;  
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . . , unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered 
entity; or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job 
applicant or employee who is [otherwise qualified], if such 
denial is based on the need . . . to make reasonable 
accommodation . . . ;  
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other 
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an 
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with 
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria 
 
 45 Arline, 480 U.S. at 289. 
 46 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).  For the relevant details of Bragdon, 
see discussion infra Section III.D. 
 47 Id. at 628–29. 
 48 Id. at 647. 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
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. . . is shown to be job-related for the position in question and 
is consistent with business necessity; and  
(7) [subjecting applicants or employees to prohibited medical 
inquiries or examinations].50 
The “ADA does not preempt any Federal law, or any State or local 
law, that grants to individuals with disabilities protection greater than 
or equivalent to that provided by the ADA.”51  But “the ADA does 
preempt inconsistent requirements established by State or local law for 
safety or security sensitive positions.”52  For example, “suppose a 
municipality has an ordinance that prohibits individuals with 
tuberculosis from teaching school children;” if a teacher with “dormant 
tuberculosis challenges a private school’s refusal to hire him or her on 
the basis of the tuberculosis, the private school would not be able to rely 
on the city ordinance as a defense under the ADA.”53 
B.  COVID-19 as a “Disability” 
The ADA states:  
An individual is considered to have a “disability” if that 
individual (1) has physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life 
activities (the “actual disability” prong); (2) has a record of 
such an impairment (the “record of” prong); or (3) is regarded 
by the covered entity as an individual with a disability . . . (the 
“regarded as” prong).54   
The rules of construction for the ADA require that the definition of 
“disability” “be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to 
the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA].”55  To be a 
person with a “disability” under the ADA, “an individual is only required 
to satisfy one prong.”56 
The terms “substantially limits” and “major life activities” apply to 
both the first and second prongs where individuals are “affirmatively 
seeking reasonable accommodations,”57 so they will be defined here and 
discussed more specifically below in the appropriate sections.   
 
 
 50 See id. § 12112(b), (d).   
 51 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §1630.1(c) (2019).   
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g) (emphasis added).   
 55 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).   
 56 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g)(2).   
 57 Id. § 1630.2(j) 
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First, the term “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a 
demanding standard” and is to be “construed broadly in favor of 
expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of 
the ADA.”58  Congress stated the term “should not be unduly used as a 
tool for excluding individuals from the ADA’s protections.”59  The 
impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the 
individual from performing a major life activity in order to be 
considered substantially limiting,” but instead should simply “limit the 
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to 
most people in the general population.”60  In other words, the “level of 
limitation required is ‘substantial’ as compared to most people in the 
general population, which does not require a significant or severe 
restriction.”61  The “primary object of attention” is whether employers 
comply with their ADA obligations, so the issue of “whether an 
impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand 
extensive analysis,” and should not require “scientific, medical, or 
statistical analysis”—although such evidence is not prohibited.62  
Nevertheless, “[n]ot every impairment will constitute a disability within 
the meaning of this section.”63  Importantly, temporary impairments 
lasting less than six months can be substantially limiting, as discussed 
below.   
Second, the ADA’s list of major activities that can be affected by 
COVID-19 includes “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . . 
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, . . . concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”64  
The ADA also includes the operation of “major bodily functions” as 
“major life activities,” including the operation of the lungs, the 
respiratory system, and other major bodily functions potentially 
affected by COVID-19.65   
1.  Actual Disability Prong 
Most COVID-19 survivors will not qualify as having an actual 
disability under the ADA.  The actual disability prong of the ADA defines 
disability as an individual having a physical or mental impairment that 
 
 58 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).   
 59 Id. 
 60 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).   
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii), (v).   
 63 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415 (W.D. Pa. 2013); 
Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2012).   
 64 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (emphasis added). 
 65 Id.  
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substantially limits one or more major life activities.66  The duration of 
the impairment is “only one factor in determining whether the 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and impairments 
that last only a short period of time may be covered if sufficiently 
severe.”67  As noted above, COVID-19 patients experience a range of 
symptoms ranging from no symptoms (i.e., asymptomatic) to mild 
upper respiratory tract illness like the “common cold” to severe 
pneumonia, to respiratory failure.68  Whether or not the individual has 
an actual disability related to COVID-19 infection under the first prong 
of the ADA will require an individualized assessment.  The “test is 
whether, at the time of the adverse employment action, the limitation 
caused by the impairment was ‘substantial.’”69   
First, severe cases requiring hospitalization like those with severe 
pneumonia or respiratory failure, especially if there are permanent 
effects, will likely qualify as disabilities under the ADA.  For example, in 
Arline, the teacher was hospitalized for an acute form of TB “in such a 
degree that it affected her respiratory system.”70  The Supreme Court 
noted that “Arline thus had a physical impairment . . . affecting her 
respiratory system . . . serious enough to require hospitalization, a fact 
more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life 
activities were substantially limited by her impairment.”71   
For COVID-19 patients, one Chinese study of over 70,000 cases 
found that approximately 19% of patients required hospitalization for 
“severe” or “critical” symptoms, with 14% of cases being “severe” (i.e., 
including shortness of breath, high respiratory frequency, low blood 
oxygen, and/or chest x-ray changes) and 5% being “critical” (i.e., 
including respiratory failure, shock, and/or multiple organ failure).72  
During the illnesses and immediate recovery period of patients who 
were hospitalized for COVID-19 and presented ongoing symptoms, 
major life activities ranging from breathing to simply walking are likely 
demonstrably substantially limited by the impairment resulting from 
the COVID-19 infection.73  The timing of the adverse employment action 
 
 66 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g).   
 67 Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans 
With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 16982 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 68 Zhou et al., supra note 15, at 1054.   
 69 Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 417 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
 70 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). 
 71 Id.  
 72 See Wu & McGoogan, supra note 14, at 1239.  
 73 See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans 
With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 
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in relation to the employee’s impairment status will be determinative.74  
Therefore, it seems likely that this population of serious or critically ill 
COVID-19 patients (i.e., approximately one-fifth (around 19%) of 
COVID-19 patients) will be considered disabled under the first prong 
during the time they are severely affected by the disease.   
Second, in contrast, less severe COVID-19 cases that likely do not 
require hospitalization (i.e., approximately 81% of COVID-19 cases)75 
and that completely resolve within a few weeks are unlikely to be 
considered actual disabilities.  Generally, the ADA was not adopted to 
address “minor, transitory impairments [e.g., the “common cold” or flu], 
except if of such a severe nature that one could not avoid considering 
them disabilities.”76  Therefore, most short-term impairments—like 
broken wrists that set properly or brief illnesses—do not qualify for 
ADA coverage, but some temporary conditions might be covered.77  “The 
duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in determining 
whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity,” and 
“[i]mpairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not 
covered, although they may be covered if sufficiently severe.”78  The ADA 
requires that the “qualifying impairment create an ‘important’ 
limitation.”79  According to the WHO, mild COVID-19 cases typically 
resolve in around two weeks, while severe cases usually resolve in three 
to six weeks.80 
Many courts have found that “[t]emporary conditions, such as back 
or knee injuries,” are not disabilities under the ADA “even though they 
may have substantially interfered with a major life activity for a period 
 
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).  If the COVID-19-related impairments are sufficiently severe—even 
for a relatively short amount of time—they may qualify as a “disability” under the ADA 
because duration is “only one factor” to be used in the determination.   
 74 Bush, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 417 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (“[T]he test is whether, at the time 
of the adverse employment action, the limitation caused by the impairment was 
‘substantial.”).   
 75 See Wu & McGoogan, supra note 14, at 1239 (“Most cases were classified as mild 
(81%; i.e., nonpneumonia and mild pneumonia).”).   
 76 Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513 (E.D. Pa. 2012).   
 77 Id.  
 78 See Bush, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 418; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2019) 
(quoting Joint Hoyer-Sensenbrenner Statement on the Origins of the ADA Restoration 
Act of 2008, H.R. 3195 (reviewing provisions of H.R. 3195 as revised following 
negotiations between representatives of the disability and business communities) at 5). 
 79 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, at 9 (2008). 
 80 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) 1, 14 (Feb. 2020) [hereinafter WHO, JOINT 
MISSION], https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-
mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf. 
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of time.”81  For example, one court found that two weeks of pain and 
difficulty returning to work after knee surgery did “not rise to the level 
of important, let alone, substantial limitations on a major life activity”; 
the court observed that the plaintiff’s claims “simply do not rise to the 
level necessary to infer any disability under the ADA.”82  Similarly, 
broken bones, as well as joint sprains, are often not sufficient to 
qualify.83  Likewise, short-term, intermittent back pain has often been 
found to not qualify as an actual impairment.  For example, one court 
discussing short-term back pain explained that a “temporary non-
chronic impairment of short duration is not a disability covered by the 
[ADA]” and that the “evidence . . . would not allow a reasonable juror to 
conclude that plaintiff’s limitations were anything more than temporary 
impairments.”84  Even shingles leaving permanent visible facial marks 
and pulmonary hypertension of several months have been found 
insufficient under the first prong of the ADA.85  There are many other 
examples.86   
Some courts even make more generalized findings that seem to 
conflict with the idea that some temporary impairments can be actual 
disabilities.  One court, for example, found that transitory illnesses with 
no permanent effects are not impairments within the meaning of the 
 
 81 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1995). 
 82 Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513–15 (E.D. Pa. 
2012). 
 83 See, e.g., Kruger v. Hamilton Manor Nursing Home, 10 F. Supp. 3d 385, 389 
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding a broken arm insufficient); Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp., 900 F. 
Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding a broken ankle insufficient).   
 84 Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012).  See, e.g., Nehan v. 
Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 957, 975 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding an employee 
with a temporary and brief back condition was not disabled); Mazur v. N.Y.C. Dept. of 
Educ., 53 F. Supp. 3d 618, 635–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding a teacher with an ankle injury 
was not disabled); Palmieri v. City of Hartford, 947 F. Supp. 2d 187, 199 (D. Conn. 2013) 
(finding that a police officer who fully recovered within a year with a back injury was 
not disabled).   
 85 Adams v. City of Chicago, 706 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 86 See, e.g., Willis v. Noble Envtl. Power, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (N.D. Tex. 
2015) (finding dehydration and heat stroke were not disabilities); Peterson v. Garmin 
Int’l, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1318 (D. Kan. 2011) (finding that fecal incontinence 
resolving after one year was not a disability); Anderson v. United Conveyor Supply Co., 
461 F. Supp. 2d 699, 706 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding that hysterectomy recovery period was 
not a disability).   
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ADA. 87  Another court said an impairment must be long-term or 
permanent to be considered a disability under the ADA.88   
But some courts do find that temporary impairments can be actual 
impairments, and an individualized assessment is necessary to make 
this determination because “[n]othing in the statutory law prohibits 
temporary impairments from qualifying as a disability.”89  For example, 
one court found that a lumbar disc herniation and temporary 
degenerative changes did not bar an ADA claim and that impairments 
lasting less than six months can be substantially limiting under the 
ADA.90  Similarly, courts have found that temporary impairments—such 
as a hernia,91 lifting restrictions during pregnancy,92 and sarcoidosis 
flare-ups93—may constitute a disability.  
Third, even fully recovered individuals with a history of severe 
COVID-19 disease will unlikely be considered disabled under the actual 
disability prong once they are recovered, unless they suffered some 
other permanent disability related to the disease (e.g., permanent lung 
disease).  Most hospitalized patients recover within around six weeks.94 
If the adverse employment action occurs after a full recovery, then the 
ADA’s actual impairment prong will be unlikely to apply—so the other 
prongs (discussed below) will come into play.   
2.  “Record of” a Disability Prong 
Most COVID-19 survivors will not qualify for protection under the 
ADA as having a “record of” disability since 81% of the cases are 
asymptomatic or mild.95  The second prong of the ADA’s definition of 
“disability” provides that “an individual with a record of an impairment 
that substantially limits or limited a major life activity is an individual 
 
 87 Lopez v. Kempthorne, 684 F. Supp. 2d 827, 867–68 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (quoting de la 
Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986)) (“An ‘impairment’ does not 
include ‘transitory illnesses which have no permanent effect on the person’s health.’”). 
 88 See Bibee v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 991 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2013) 
(quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002))(“[T]he 
impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long-term.”). 
 89 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1995); see also Clemente v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 213 
F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that temporary impairments are not precluded from 
constituting a disability under the ADA).   
 90 Hodges v. District of Columbia, 959 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 91 Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 854, 881 (N.D. Ill. 
2014).   
 92 Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 93 Allen v. Baltimore Cty., 91 F. Supp. 3d 722, 731 (D. Md. 2015). 
 94 WHO, JOINT MISSION, supra note 80, at 14.   
 95 Wu & McGoogan, supra note 14, at 1239 (“Most cases were classified as mild 
(81%; i.e., nonpneumonia and mild pneumonia).”).   
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:05 PM 
2020] COVID-19 AND THE ADA 397 
with a disability.”96  EEOC regulations say that an individual “has a 
record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been 
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”97  Additionally, the 
EEOC states that the prong “shall be construed broadly to the maximum 
extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive 
analysis.”98  The alleged disability “must be one that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities; a record of recovery from a minor 
laceration or the common cold would not qualify for coverage under this 
definition.”99 
The “record of” prong is intended “to ensure that people are not 
discriminated against because of a history of disability.”100  For example, 
this prong protects “an individual who was treated for cancer ten years 
ago but who is now deemed by a doctor to be free of cancer, from 
discrimination based on that prior medical history.”101   
Records that might be used to demonstrate the impairment include 
“education, medical, or employment records,” among others.102  In 
Arline, the Supreme Court noted that “Arline’s hospitalization for 
tuberculosis in 1957 suffices to establish that she has a ‘record of . . . 
impairment’ . . . and is therefore a handicapped individual.”103  The 
individual is covered even if the “covered entity does not specifically 
know about the relevant record.”104  But, of course, the individual will 
have to “prove that the covered entity discriminated on the basis of the 
record of the disability” for the covered entity to be liable for disability 
discrimination under this prong.105  Individuals often are covered by 
both the first and second prong, although they only have to be covered 
by one prong to meet the definition of disability as noted above.106  An 
individual with a record of a disability is entitled to reasonable 
accommodations (discussed below).107   
 
 
 96 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (2019).   
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1995). 
 100 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (2019). 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 104 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
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COVID-19 patients who were hospitalized with serious or critical 
illness can likely fulfill the “record of” prong based upon their hospital 
records,108 and therefore, are likely to qualify as having a “disability” 
under the definitions of both the first and second prongs.  But the other 
81% of COVID-19 survivors are unlikely to qualify under the second 
prong for the same reasons that they did not qualify under the first 
prong—specifically, they will likely be unable to show substantial 
limitations of a major life activity where their disease was mild and 
resolved in a few weeks.  Courts have generally not found a “record of” 
disability in such situations.109   
3.  Regarded as Having a Disability Prong 
In some cases of people with impairments—especially those 
involving infectious diseases—“the negative reactions of others are just 
as disabling as the actual impact of an impairment.”110  The Supreme 
Court noted, “Congress was as concerned about the effect of an 
impairment on others as it was about its effect on the individual,” so 
Congress “extended coverage . . . to those individuals who are simply 
‘regarded as having’ a physical or mental impairment.”111  The “regarded 
as” prong was intended to “express Congress’s understanding that 
‘unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about 
disabilities are often just as disabling as actual impairments, and its 
corresponding desire to prohibit discrimination founded on such 
perceptions.’”112   
An individual “meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having 
such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been 
subjected to [discriminatory] action . . . because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity”; but this 
 
 108 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.  
 109 See, e.g., Corning v. LodgeNet Interactive Corp., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (M.D. 
Fla. 2012) (finding that an employee must still show substantial limits of a major life 
activity, even though there was a record of his FMLA leave and his supervisor’s 
knowledge of his kidney failure and chronic heart failure); Jenkins-Allen v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892–93 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that seven 
months of workers’ compensation leave for surgery on both hands for carpal tunnel 
syndrome alone did not provide a record of disability because the employee returned to 
work without restrictions and her continuing pain did not substantially limit a major life 
activity); Maldonado v. Cooperativa de Ahorro, 685 F. Supp. 2d 264, 274 (D.P.R. 2010) 
(finding a record of sleep apnea was not a record of impairment where it did not limit 
any major life activity).   
 110 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l) (2019). 
 111 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987).   
 112 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l) (emphasis added).   
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“shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor,” which is 
defined as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six 
months or less.”113  Employers are prohibited from taking 
discriminatory actions such as “refusal to hire, demotion, placement on 
involuntary leave, termination, exclusion for failure to meet a 
qualification standard, harassment, or denial of any other term, 
condition, or privilege of employment,” among others. 114  Liability on 
the part of an employer, however, often turns on whether an employer 
provides a valid defense, like direct threat (discussed below).115  Also, 
for liability to ensue, the plaintiff still must show causation—i.e., that the 
employer discriminated on the basis of disability.116   
There is no functional test under the “regarded as” prong; in other 
words, the “concepts of ‘major life activities’ and ‘substantial limitation’ 
simply are not relevant” under this prong.117  The EEOC says that the 
application is “straightforward” and gives a couple of examples: (1) “if 
an employer refused to hire an applicant because of skin graft scars, the 
employer has regarded the applicant as an individual with a 
disability;”118 and (2) “if an employer terminates an employee because 
he has cancer, the employer has regarded the employee as an individual 
with a disability.”119   
The Supreme Court provided that “a person who would be covered 
. . . [includes] a person with some kind of visible physical impairment 
which in fact does not substantially limit that person’s functioning.”120  
The Court noted that “[s]uch an impairment might not diminish a 
person’s physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless 
substantially limit the person’s ability to work as a result of the negative 
reactions of others to the impairment.”121  By including the “regarded as” 
prong, the Court observed that “Congress acknowledged that society’s 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as 
handicapping as the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment.”122   
 
 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).   
 114 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.   
 119 Id. 
 120 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987).   
 121 Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
 122 Id. at 284. 
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Society’s myths, fears, and negative reactions to disability are 
nowhere greater than for communicable diseases like COVID-19.  The 
CDC describes public health emergencies as “stressful times for people 
and communities” where “[f]ear and anxiety about a disease can lead to 
social stigma . . . toward people, places, or things.”123  According to the 
CDC, “[s]tigmatization is especially common in disease outbreaks,” and 
stigmatized groups “may be subjected to social avoidance or rejection[, 
as well as] denial of health care . . . [and] employment.”124  The CDC and 
state departments of health also note that stigma can occur “after a 
person has recovered from COVID-19,” even though they are no longer 
considered a risk for spreading the virus.125   
In Arline, the Supreme Court held that a school teacher with a 
history of an infectious disease, TB, was regarded as having a disability 
because “her employer perceived her to be contagious,” and those fears 
“were grounded in the misperception that she was currently 
contagious.”126   
More recently, a Minnesota court considered the case of an 
employee who was fired at the peak of the swine flu panic in 2009.127  
The plaintiff worked for fourteen years for a quarry in Minnesota as “a 
good employee with satisfactory performance reviews” when he left to 
go home to see his sister who was gravely ill and actually died before he 
could get there.128  When he tried to return to work after his sister’s 
funeral, the human resources director “told him that he was being fired 
because [his employer] feared that he had contracted the swine flu 
during his trip,” and he was instructed that “due to health and safety 
concerns arising out of his trip . . . , he should not come on site without 
contacting the company.”129  The court conceded that “[l]ittle was 
known about swine flu [at the time of Valdez’ firing], and medical 
authorities feared the worst.”130  The court observed that “Valdez was 
terminated at the height of . . . public hysteria” when “[s]wine flu was 
declared a public-health emergency[] and there was widespread panic 
 
 123 CDC, Reducing Stigma, supra note 8. 
 124 Addressing Stigma, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://emergency.
cdc.gov/cerc/cerccorner/article_123016.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).   
 125 CDC, Reducing Stigma, supra note 8; see also COVID-19: Stigma, GEORGIA DEP’T OF 
PUB. HEALTH, https://dph.georgia.gov/covid-19-stigma (last updated June 11, 2020). 
 126 EEOC v. STME, LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212–13 (M.D. Fla. 2018), aff’d, 938 F.3d 
1305 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Arline, 480 U.S. 273, at 284). 
 127 Valdez v. Minn. Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801, 2012 WL 6112846, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Dec. 10, 2012). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at *3. 
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about the possibility of a deadly pandemic.”131  Even so, the Minnesota 
district court found that the plaintiff was not “regarded as” disabled in 
this case because swine flu objectively fell under the “transient and 
minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong.132  
The “regarded as” prong “shall not apply to impairments that are 
transitory and minor,” which is defined as “an impairment with an 
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”133  This “transient and 
minor” exception does not apply to the other prongs.134  “Transitory” is 
defined as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less.”135  “Minor” is not defined by the statute or the 
regulations.136   
According to the legislative history, the purpose of the “transitory 
and minor” exception is to exclude “‘common ailments like the cold or 
flu’ from being considered disabilities under the ‘regarded as’ prong.”137  
According to the EEOC, the transitory and minor exception to the 
“regarded as” prong “responds to concerns raised by employer 
organizations and is reasonable . . . because individuals seeking 
coverage under this prong need not meet the functional limitation 
requirement contained in the first two prongs of the definition.”138  The 
EEOC noted that the 2008 House Judiciary Committee explained that:  
absent this exception, the third prong of the definition would 
have covered individuals who are regarded as having common 
ailments like the cold or flu, and this exception responds to 
concerns raised by members of the business community 
regarding potential abuse of this provision and misapplication 
of resources on individuals with minor ailments that last only 
a short period of time.139   
Transitory and minor are defined objectively; in other words, 
“what matters is whether the impairment is, in fact, transitory and 
minor”—not what the employer subjectively believed, so that the 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.  
 133 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
 134 Id.; Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, as amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978-01 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).   
 135 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).  
 136 Valdez v. Minn. Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801, 2012 WL 6112846, at *2 (D. Minn. 
Dec. 10, 2012). 
 137 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).   
 138 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §1630.2(l) (2019).  
 139 Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008)). 
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employer cannot prevail by arguing it believed the ailment was only 
transitory and minor.140   
In the Minnesota swine flu case, the plaintiff conceded that the 
“swine flu is ‘transitory’ for purposes of the ADA.”141  By the time of oral 
arguments, the plaintiff also conceded—and the court agreed—“that 
swine flu as it is now understood is also ‘minor’ for purposes of the ADA, 
in the sense that it has not turned out to be more serious than the 
seasonal flu, and seasonal flu is undoubtedly ‘transitory and minor’ for 
purposes of the ADA.”142  In arriving at this conclusion, the Valdez court 
quoted an expert affidavit in 2012 as “estimating a total of 274,000 
hospitalizations and 12,470 deaths in the United States due to swine flu 
from April 2009 to April 2010” and compared it to estimates from a CDC 
website stating that “each year in the United States more than 200,000 
people are hospitalized for seasonal flu-related complications and that 
seasonal flu related deaths have ranged from a low of 3,000 to a high of 
49,000 per year in the three decades preceding 2006.”143   
In determining that Valdez was not disabled under the “regarded 
as” prong, the court noted, “It is clear under the statute and the 
implementing regulations that the Court must decide whether an 
impairment is ‘transitory and minor’ on an objective basis,” and “from 
an objective standpoint, swine flu must be considered transitory and 
minor.”144  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the fact that 
the swine flu “has a mortality and hospitalization profile similar to that 
of seasonal flu, and the legislative history cites seasonal flu as the 
paradigmatic example of a transitory and minor ailment.”145  The court 
found that “because swine flu is objectively transitory and minor, it is 
not a disability under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA.”146  The court 
therefore granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment.147   
If other courts follow this example, disability discrimination 
against COVID-19 survivors may be difficult to prevent under the 
“regarded as” prong—depending upon the ultimate morbidity and 
 
 140 Valdez, 2012 WL 6112846, at *2 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(f)).   
 141 Id. at *3. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at *3. 
 145 Id.   
 146 Valdez, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3 (concluding that swine flu is transitory and 
minor); EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/pandemic_flu.html (technical 
assistance document for employers indicating that swine flu is not a disability within the 
meaning of the ADA).   
 147 Valdez, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3–4.  
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mortality of the disease compared to seasonal influenza.  National and 
state emergencies and disasters have been declared, people are 
consistently behaving irrationally with panic (e.g., buying up all of the 
toilet paper), and the National Guard has even been called out in some 
states over the COVID-19 panic.  But, according to the Valdez court, the 
ultimate determination of protection for COVID-19 survivors under the 
ADA’s “regarded as” prong will depend upon how COVID-19’s morbidity 
and mortality statistics stack up against seasonal influenza.   
Strong arguments can already be made that COVID-19 is not 
objectively “mild” when compared to seasonal influenza, and the EEOC 
notes that the “transient and minor exception” to the “regarded as” 
prong “should be construed narrowly.”148  Whether or not courts 
consider individuals with mild, asymptomatic, or suspected COVID-19 
cases to be “regarded as” disabled under the ADA may depend on a 
comparison of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality statistics to seasonal 
influenza statistics at the time, if they follow the Minnesota court’s 
example.   
Comparisons of COVID-19 to seasonal influenza can be 
misleading.149  For example, by May 2020, approximately 65,000 deaths 
in the United States were attributed to COVID-19, which was very 
similar to the number of seasonal influenza deaths that the CDC reports 
annually.150  Some have estimated that the ultimate case fatality rate 
may be similar to that of seasonal influenza.151  But researchers point 
out that the conditions on the frontline of clinical care for COVID-19 
have been much different than for seasonal influenza because the 
“demand on hospital resources during the COVID-19 crisis has not 
occurred before in the US, even during the worst of influenza 
seasons.”152  Weekly comparisons between COVID-19 and seasonal 
 
 148 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(l) (2019). 
 149 Jeremy Samuel Faust & Carlos del Rio, Assessment of Deaths From COVID-19 and 
From Seasonal Influenza, 180(8) JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1045, 1045–46 (May 14, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2766121 
(stating that comparisons of COVID-19 to seasonal influenza is not a valid comparison).   
 150 Id. at 1045 (pointing out that by May 2020, there were around 65,000 deaths in 
the United States related to COVID-19, which was deceptively similar to the number of 
annual influenza deaths).  
 151 Fauci et al., supra note 31, at 1268 (“[T]he overall clinical consequences of  
COVID-19 may ultimately be more akin to those of severe seasonal influenza (which has 
a case fatality rate of approximately 0.1%).”).   
 152 Faust & del Rio, supra note 149, at 1045 (explaining that “[t]his apparent 
equivalence of deaths from COVID-19 and seasonal influenza does not match frontline 
clinical conditions, especially in some hot zones of the pandemic where ventilators have 
been in short supply and many hospitals have been stretched beyond their limits” and 
pointing out that “[t]he demand on hospital resources during the COVID-19 crisis has 
not occurred before in the US, even during the worst of influenza seasons”).   
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influenza deaths are more revealing.  For example, the highest number 
of deaths during any peak week of seasonal influenza from 2013 to 2020 
was 1,626 deaths during one week in 2018, compared to two weeks in 
April 2020 with 15,455 and 14,478 COVID-19 deaths.153  In recent 
history, there have never been similar weekly totals of peak deaths from 
seasonal influenza, and the number of COVID-19 deaths during a 
possible peak week in 2020 were “9.5-fold to 44.1-fold greater than the 
peak week of counted influenza deaths during the past seven influenza 
seasons in the US, with a 20.5-fold mean increase.”154  In addition, 
COVID-19 deaths “may be undercounted owing to ongoing limitations 
of test capacity or false-negative test results.”155 
Considering only the morbidity and mortality data, courts could 
conceivably decide that mild, asymptomatic, or suspected COVID-19 
cases meet the transitory and minor exception.  As noted above, by July 
26, 2020, a total of 16,076,713 global cases were reported, accounting 
for 644,661 deaths for a possible case fatality rate of 4.0%.156  In the 
United States, the CDC estimates that the case fatality rate is around 
0.4%.157  Seasonal influenza has a case fatality rate of approximately 
0.1%, and some researchers suggest that COVID-19’s case fatality rate 
may be similar.158  Although the mortality rate of 0.4% is four times 
higher than the 0.1% rate associated with seasonal influenza, some 
courts could still conceivably regard the 0.4% rate to be “minor”—even 
though the COVID-19 pandemic has been much more severe than any 
recent seasonal influenza outbreak based upon the weekly and total 
statistics noted above.  Employers and employees will have to wait until 
more evidence is available to know whether COVID-19 will be 
considered objectively transitory and minor under the ADA or not, 
similar to the swine flu case.  In the meantime, employers who take 
adverse actions against employees “regarded as” having COVID-19 may 
face liability under the ADA, and employees dealing with COVID-19 face 
uncertainty regarding their protected status.   
 
 
 153 Id.   
 154 Id.   
 155 Id. (noting that some cities, “such as New York City,” may include “some deaths 
that have been labeled as having been caused by COVID-19 [but] are not due to  
COVID-19”). 
 156 COVID-19 Operations Dashboard, supra note 29.   
 157 Azad, supra note 30; CDC, Pandemic Planning, supra note 30.  
 158 Fauci et al., supra note 31, at 1268 (“[T]he overall clinical consequences of  
COVID-19 may ultimately be more akin to those of severe seasonal influenza (which has 
a case fatality rate of approximately 0.1%).”).   
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In contrast, employees who travel to places where COVID-19 is 
active will likely be unprotected by the ADA if their employer takes an 
adverse employment action based upon a 2019 Eleventh Circuit case 
where the EEOC alleged that the employer discriminated against the 
employee who planned travel to an area with Ebola because it regarded 
her as disabled.159  The Eleventh Circuit declined “to expand the 
regarded as disabled definition in the ADA to cover cases, such as this 
one, in which an employer perceives an employee to be presently 
healthy with only the potential to become disabled in the future due to 
voluntary conduct.”160  Similar logic will likely apply to employees who 
travel to COVID-19 “hotspots” without intervening quarantine time. 
Finally, regardless of the above analysis, the “direct threat” 
affirmative defense, noted below in Section III.D., may eliminate the 
employee from being considered an individual with a disability under 
the ADA if the person is potentially contagious with COVID-19 and a 
danger to others.   
C.  Susceptibility to COVID-19 Complications and Death as a 
Disability 
Individuals who are vulnerable to suffering complications or death 
from COVID-19 may form a new class of individuals with disabilities 
under the ADA because employers may be hesitant to hire them, treat 
them equally, or make accommodations to reduce their infection/death 
risks.161  Individuals with special susceptibilities are individuals with 
disabilities under the ADA in some circumstances.162  The CDC estimates 
that around 47% of U.S. adults have at least one of “five underlying 
medical conditions associated with increased risk for severe COVID-19-
associated illness.”163  The CDC also noted that the “[r]isk for severe 
 
 159 EEOC v. STME, LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212–13 (M.D. Fla. 2018), aff’d, 938 F.3d 
1305 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 160 Id. at 1213. 
 161 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g) (2019) (providing that under the ADA, “[a]n 
individual is considered to have a ‘disability’ if that individual (1) has a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life 
activities (the ‘actual disability’ prong); (2) has a record of such an impairment (the 
‘record of’ prong); or (3) is regarded by the covered entity as an individual with a 
disability as defined in § 1630.2(l) (the ‘regarded as’ prong)” and the definition is to be 
broadly construed) (emphasis added). 
 162 See, e.g., Staron v. McDonald’s, 51 F.3d 353, 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that 
individuals with special susceptibilities are entitled to an individualized assessment 
characterized as a “fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry” under the ADA). 
 163 Hilda Razzaghi et al., Estimated County-Level Prevalence of Selected Underlying 
Medical Conditions Associated with Increased Risk for Severe COVID-19 Illness—United 
States, 2018, 69(29) CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 945, 947, 949 (July 24, 
2020) (emphasis added), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm69
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[COVID-19]-associated illness (illness requiring hospitalization, 
intensive care unit admission, mechanical ventilation, or resulting in 
death) increases with increasing age.”164   
Depending upon an individualized analysis, many vulnerable 
individuals’ COVID-19-related risks could be found to substantially limit 
major life activities like “caring for oneself” (e.g., due to risk of going to 
places like the grocery store) and “working” (e.g., due to infectious risks 
in some public work environments); therefore, a new population of 
high-risk individuals may be considered disabled under the ADA by 
some courts.165  Reasonable accommodations are required by the ADA 
for individuals who qualify as having a disability under the actual 
impairment or “record of” prong.166   
The CDC considers individuals at “high risk for severe illness from 
COVID-19” to include people age 65 years and older and “people of all 
ages with underlying medical conditions,” particularly if not well 
controlled—including chronic lung disease, diabetes, 
immunocompromise (e.g., transplant recipients, some cancer patients, 
HIV-positive individuals), severe obesity (i.e., BMI > 40), serious heart 
conditions, moderate to severe asthma, among others.167  In a study of 
New York hospitalized patients, researchers found older age, obesity, 
diabetes, and high blood pressure to be significant risk factors for 
COVID-19 complications and death.168  According to CDC data, the 
underlying medical conditions with the “strongest and most consistent 
evidence of association with higher risk for severe COVID-19-associated 
illness . . . included chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
heart conditions, diabetes mellitus, chronic kidney disease, and obesity 
(defined as body mass index [BMI] of > 30 kg per m2).”169  For patients 
 
29a1.htm (observing “[t]he median model-based estimate of the prevalence of any of 
five underlying medical conditions [including chronic  obstructive pulmonary disease, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic kidney disease, and obesity] associated with 
increased risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness among U.S. adults was 47.2% 
among 3,142 U.S. counties” and “[t]he overall weighted prevalences of these conditions 
were 30.9% (obesity), 11.4% (diabetes), 6.9% (COPD), 6.8% (heart disease), and 3.1% 
(CKD)”).   
 164 Id. at 945.   
 165 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).   
 166 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).   
 167 Frequently Asked Questions: People at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (August 4, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/
2019-ncov/faq.html#Higher-Risk [hereinafter CDC Higher Risk]. 
 168 Richardson et al., supra note 22, at 2054 (reporting the most common 
comorbidities were hypertension (56.6%), obesity (41.7%), and diabetes (33.8%)); 
Zhou et al., supra note 15, at 1054 (noting older age and other comorbidities as 
significant risk factors).   
 169 Razzaghi et al., supra note 163, at 946.   
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with one of these underlying medical conditions, “hospitalizations were 
six times higher, ICU admissions five times higher, and deaths 12 times 
higher” than for patients without underlying medical conditions.170   
Courts have already evaluated some of these potential disabilities, 
but the results may be different in the aftermath of COVID-19.  First, 
people with diabetes may be more clearly viewed as individuals with 
disabilities under the ADA due to COVID-19-related risks.  As one 
example of a substantially limiting impairment, EEOC regulations state 
that “diabetes substantially limits endocrine function,” implying that 
diabetes is a disability.171  While some courts have agreed,172 other 
courts find that diabetes alone is not a disability.173  Second, high blood 
pressure (hypertension) may be considered a disability due to COVID-
19-related risks in some people, although it has inconsistently been 
found to constitute a disability in the past.174   
To comply with CDC social distancing guidelines and other health 
measures, individuals with diabetes and/or high blood pressure may 
now be better classified as individuals with disabilities under the ADA 
where such conditions substantially limit major life activities like 
visiting stores (e.g., grocery stores), missing family outings, etc.  
Individuals with other high-risk comorbidities—such as cancer, kidney 
disease, heart disease, immunocompromise, among others—may be 
 
 170 Id.   
 171 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2019).   
 172 See, e.g., Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(finding that “insulin-dependent diabetes is a physical impairment” for purposes of 
determining “whether [plaintiff] is disabled within the meaning of ADA”); Rohr v. Salt 
River Project Agric Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that 
“[d]iabetes is a ’physical impairment,’” which could qualify as a disability under the 
ADA, “because it affects the digestive, hemic and endocrine systems, and eating is a 
‘major life activity’”); Schreiner v. City of Gresham, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D. Or. 2010) 
(quoting Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003)) (finding that under the 
ADA, ”‘qualified individual with a disability’ is defined broadly and includes diabetics”).  
 173 Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that an 
“employee’s diabetic condition did not substantially limit his major life activity of eating 
and, thus, was not a disability under ADA”); Diaz Rivera v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
P.R., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255 n.9 (D.P.R. 2009) (finding that “[d]iabetes by itself 
does not constitute a disability under the ADA unless it impairs an individual’s ability to 
work or engage in other major life activities”).   
 174 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E) (providing, after a modification by Congress, that that 
the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity 
shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as 
. . . [anti-hypertensive] medication [and] medical supplies”); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding hypertension controlled by medications 
was not a disability at the time of this decision); Williams v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs., 7 F. App’x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that “the activities affected by 
Plaintiff’s hypertension [can] constitute “major life activities” because of their 
significance in the human experience”).   
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:05 PM 
408 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:383 
more clearly covered by the ADA because these comorbidities 
substantially limit major life activities where high-risk individuals, in 
order to follow CDC guidance, may be forced to seek accommodations at 
work to avoid the disease and its potential complications.  
Other more controversial groups might claim “disability” under the 
ADA due to COVID-19-related risks—such as for obesity and age.  For 
example, individuals with obesity have been shown to be at high risk of 
COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality.175  Traditionally, courts find 
that physical characteristics like “height, weight, and muscle tone” are 
not considered “impairments” unless they result from an “underlying 
physiological disorder.”176  EEOC regulations state that “weight is 
merely a physical characteristic—not a physical impairment—unless it 
is both outside the normal range and the result of an underlying 
physiological disorder.”177  But an individualized assessment of a case in 
the post-COVID-19 era could result in a different outcome due to the 
risks associated with COVID-19 in the severely obese.   
Another example likely to garner some attention is advanced age, 
due to its association with COVID-19-related risks.178  Researchers and 
the CDC find that advanced age alone is a significant risk factor for 
COVID-19 related complications—specifically for individuals older than 
65.179  Traditionally, advanced age alone is not considered an 
impairment under the ADA, but “various medical conditions commonly 
associated with age” can “constitute impairments” within the meaning 
 
 175 Razzaghi et al., supra note 163, at 945.   
 176 Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109–13 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that 
“[a]s with the physical characteristics of height, weight, and muscle tone, ‘other 
conditions’ are not ‘impairments’ unless they are the result of an underlying 
physiological disorder”; also stating that “[t]aken as a whole, the relevant statutory and 
regulatory language makes it clear that for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment—
and thus a disability—under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological 
disorder or condition”; and concluding that “for obesity, even morbid obesity, to be 
considered a physical impairment [under the ADA], it must result from an underlying 
physiological disorder or condition”); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 
442–43 (6th Cir.2006) (declining to “extend ADA protection to all ‘abnormal’ (whatever 
that term means) physical characteristics” because “[t]o do so ‘would make the central 
purpose of the statutes, to protect the disabled, incidental to the operation of the 
“regarded as” prong, which would become a catch-all cause of action for discrimination 
based on appearance, size, and any number of other things far removed from the reasons 
the statutes were passed’” (citations omitted)).  
 177 Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1112.   
 178 Razzaghi et al., supra note 163, at 945; see also CDC Higher Risk, supra note 167. 
 179 Older Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-
adults.html. 
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of the ADA’s disability definition.180 Therefore, age alone is unlikely to 
be recognized by courts as an “impairment.”  An exception may apply 
where courts consider people of advanced age who are confined to 
nursing homes because their presence in the nursing home may signify 
substantial limitations in the major life activity of “caring for oneself” 
and other similar independent living activities.   
Whether or not courts consider risk factors as disabilities could 
have significant consequences.  Under Title I of the ADA, employers may 
not discriminate “on the basis of disability in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, or other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”181  EEOC regulations take a paternalistic 
 
 180 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2019); see also Natarelli v. N.Y. State Off. of 
Vocational & Educ. Servs. for Individuals With Disabilities, No. 607-CV-1130 GTS/GJD, 
2009 WL 5204068, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Natarelli v. VESID Off., 
420 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Advanced age, in and of itself, is not an impairment [for 
purposes of the ADA].”); Lee v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (“Age alone . . . is not a disability for purposes of the ADA.  Although many 
octogenarians do suffer from physical or mental impairments that limit one or more of 
their major life activities and are therefore ‘individuals with disabilities’ as defined by 
the ADA, others remain physically and mentally healthy well into their ninth or tenth 
decade.”); N.A.A.C.P. v. Phila. Bd. of Elections, No. CIV. A. 97-7085, 1998 WL 321253,  
at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998) (“Being over the age of 65 is not in and of itself an 
impairment, although medical conditions associated with age, such as osteoporosis, can 
be.”). 
 181 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), (d) (Defining discrimination to 
include “(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that 
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee; (2) 
participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of 
subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee to the discrimination . . . ; 
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or other methods of administration . . . that have the 
effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or . . . that perpetuate the 
discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control; (4) 
excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because 
of the known disability; (5)(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . 
unless the covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of the covered entity; (5)(B) denying 
employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need . . . to make reasonable 
accommodation . . . ; (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other 
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or 
a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection 
criterion . . . is shown to be job related for the position in question and is consistent with 
business necessity; and (7) failing to select an administer tests concerning employment 
in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job 
applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking 
skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of 
such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting 
the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant . . . ,” and 
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approach and state that “employer[s] may require, as a qualification 
standard, that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or 
safety of himself/herself” as long as the standard applies to “all 
applicants or employees and not just to individuals with disabilities.”182  
Someone in a high-risk category may pose a risk to himself or herself 
simply by showing up to work. 
The degree of risk will be important and will vary by job specifics.  
The employer cannot deny employment opportunities to individuals 
with disabilities “merely because of a slightly increased risk,” but 
instead the “risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, 
i.e., high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is 
insufficient.”183  Employers are “permitted to require that an individual 
not pose a direct threat of harm to his or her own safety or health.”184  A 
“case-by-case” inquiry is necessary.185  “If performing the particular 
functions of a job would result in a high probability of substantial harm 
to the individual, the employer could reject or discharge the individual 
unless a reasonable accommodation that would not cause an undue 
hardship would avert the harm.”186  In addition, the employer must 
“determine whether a reasonable modification would either eliminate 
the risk or reduce the risk to an acceptable level.”187  A more thorough 
analysis of the direct threat issue is included below in Section III.D.   
III.  COVID-19 AND THE ADA IN THE WORKPLACE 
Employers will face challenges balancing legitimate concerns of 
disease transmission and health risks with the individual rights of 
employees and avoiding discrimination based upon stereotypes and 
unfounded fear.  The ADA will be important in sorting out these issues 
as the pandemic progresses and resolves for at least three reasons: (1) 
“the ADA regulates employers’ disability-related inquiries and medical 
examinations for all applicants and employees”; (2) “the ADA prohibits 
covered employers from excluding individuals with disabilities from the 
workplace for health or safety reasons unless they pose a ‘direct threat’ 
 
prohibiting covered entities from subjecting applicants or employees to prohibited 
medical inquiries or examinations).   
 182 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(r) (2019) (emphasis added). 
 183 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 184 Id.  
 185 See, e.g., Anderson v. Little League Baseball, 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992) 
(explaining that an “individualized assessment” is required to insure that “[t]he 
determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others [is] 
not based on generalizations or stereotypes”).   
 186 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(r) (2019). 
 187 Id.   
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(i.e., a significant risk of substantial harm even with reasonable 
accommodation)”; and (3) “the ADA requires reasonable 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities (absent undue 
hardship) during a pandemic.”188   
The EEOC provides guidance using established ADA principles to 
help answer questions during coronavirus-like events.  This paper relies 
upon the EEOC’s guidance, although such guidance does not carry the 
force of law.189  On March 21, 2020, the EEOC updated its 2009 guidance 
webpage “to address its application to . . . COVID-19.”190  The EEOC’s 
statement says: 
Employers and employees should follow guidance from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as well as 
state/local public health authorities on how best to slow the 
spread of this disease and protect workers, customers, clients, 
and the general public.  The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act do 
not interfere with employers following advice from the CDC 
and other public health authorities on appropriate steps to 
take relating to the workplace.191   
As the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, EEOC guidance may change and 
readers should look to the appropriate government authorities for the 
latest recommendations.   
A.  Inquiries and Medical Examinations during Hiring and Return to 
Work 
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from making “disability-
related inquiries” and requiring medical examinations of applicants and 
employees, except under limited circumstances.192  The ADA regulates 
disability-related inquiries and medical examinations at three stages: 
(1) before an offer of employment, the “ADA prohibits employers from 
making disability-related inquiries and conducting medical 
examinations of applicants”;193 (2) after a conditional offer but before 
beginning employment, the “ADA permits employers to make disability-
related inquiries and conduct medical examinations if all entering 
employees in the same job category are subject to the same inquiries 
 
 188 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
 189 See generally EEOC, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws (June 17, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/
what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-
laws.   
 190 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 191 Id.   
 192 Id.  
 193 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
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and examinations”;194 and (3) during employment, “the ADA prohibits 
employee disability-related inquiries or medical examinations unless 
they are job-related and consistent with business necessity.”195  During 
employment, “a disability-related inquiry or medical examination of an 
employee is job-related and consistent with business necessity when an 
employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that: [a]n 
employee’s ability to perform essential job functions will be impaired by 
a medical condition; or [a]n employee will pose a direct threat due to a 
medical condition.”196  The purpose of this provision is to prevent 
inquiries and medical tests that do not serve a legitimate business 
purpose; for example, “if an employee suddenly starts to use increased 
amounts of sick leave or starts to appear sickly, an employer could not 
require that employee to be tested for AIDS, HIV infection, or cancer 
unless the employer can demonstrate that such testing is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.”197  Information obtained about 
applicants or employees during any of the above disability-related 
inquiries or medical examinations must be “treated as a confidential 
medical record.”198   
1.  Disability-Related Inquiries 
According to the EEOC, “[a]n inquiry is ‘disability-related’ if it is 
likely to elicit information about a disability.”199  Disability-related 
inquiries include asking employees (or their co-workers, family 
members, or doctors) about issues like (1) “whether they have or ever 
had a disability”; (2) “the kinds of prescription medications they are 
taking”; and (3) “the results of any genetic tests they have had.”200  The 
EEOC gives the example that “asking an individual if his immune system 
is compromised is a disability-related inquiry because a weak or 
compromised immune system can be closely associated with conditions 
such as cancer or HIV/AIDS,” which are clearly disabilities.201  
“Questions that are not likely to elicit information about a disability” are 
permitted and generally include “asking employees about their general 
well-being; whether they can perform job functions; and about their 
current illegal use of drugs.”202  In Conroy, the Second Circuit found that 
 
 194 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 195 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11 (emphasis omitted).   
 196 Id.   
 197 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.13(b) (2019). 
 198 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 199 Id.  
 200 Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 201 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 202 Conroy, 333 F.3d at 96 (emphasis in original). 
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an employer’s practice of requiring employees to submit general 
diagnoses as part of a medical certification procedure after absences 
violated the ADA because it was a “disability-related” inquiry.203  
Likewise, employers cannot use applications or forms that ask 
employees to check off impairments that are potentially disabling.204  
Also, an employer cannot ask an applicant how often he will need leave 
due to incapacitation or need for treatments because of a disability, but 
can “state the attendance requirements of the job and inquire whether 
the applicant can meet them.”205   
Employers may want to identify employees with active COVID-19 
symptoms.  According to EEOC Guidance, “asking an individual about 
symptoms of a cold or the seasonal flu is not likely to elicit information 
about a disability,” since colds and seasonal flu are not considered 
disabilities.206  So, asking employees whether they have fevers, coughs, 
chills, and other symptoms related to cold and seasonal flu is likely 
allowed according to the EEOC.207  But directly asking employees 
whether or not they have had a diagnosis of COVID-19 might be a 
disability-related inquiry depending upon the ultimate resolution of the 
“regarded as” issues noted above, as well as issues regarding “direct 
threats” discussed below; the answers to some of these questions are 
simply unknowable at this time and may not be known until litigated.  
On March 20, 2020, the EEOC added the following guidance to its 
webpage on pandemic influenza:   
An employer may screen job applicants for symptoms of 
COVID-19 after making a conditional job offer, as long as it 
does so for all entering employees in the same type of job. This 
ADA rule allowing post-offer (but not pre-offer) medical 
inquiries and exams applies to all applicants, whether or not 
the applicant has a disability.208   
Remember, however, that EEOC Guidance does not carry the force of 
law, as noted above.   
During an influenza pandemic, an employer can send employees 
home who demonstrate influenza-like symptoms according to the EEOC, 
which notes that the “CDC states that employees who become ill with 
symptoms of influenza-like illness at work during a pandemic should 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(a) (2019).  
 205 Id. 
 206 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
 207 Id.   
 208 Id. (emphasis added).   
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leave the workplace.” 209  The EEOC continues, “[a]dvising such workers 
to go home is not a disability-related action if the illness is akin to 
seasonal influenza or the 2009 spring/summer H1N1 virus,” and “the 
action would be permitted under the ADA if the illness were serious 
enough to pose a direct threat.”210  The EEOC specifically notes that “an 
employer can send home an employee with COVID-19 or symptoms 
associated with [COVID-19].”211   
In addition, the employer may ask employees who report feeling ill 
at work or those who call in sick “if they are experiencing influenza-like 
symptoms” and must maintain their responses in a confidential medical 
record.212  The EEOC notes that “these inquiries are not disability-
related,” and “[i]f pandemic influenza becomes severe, the inquiries, 
even if disability-related, are justified by a reasonable belief based on 
objective evidence that the severe form of pandemic influenza poses a 
direct threat.”213  The EEOC specifically notes that “employers may ask 
employees who report feeling ill at work, or who call in sick, questions 
about their symptoms to determine if they have or may have COVID-19,” 
and describes these symptoms as “fever, chills, cough, shortness of 
breath, or sore throat.”214   
Further, employers may want to identify employees at high risk of 
complications from COVID-19, such as those with compromised 
immune systems or chronic health conditions identified by the CDC.  
However, according to the EEOC, employers generally cannot ask “an 
employee to disclose a compromised immune system or a chronic 
health condition” under the ADA because this is a disability-related 
inquiry since the “response is likely to disclose the existence of a 
disability,” unless failure to ask the question “will cause a direct threat” 
(discussed below).215  There are, however, ADA-compliant, non-
disability-related inquiries that employers can use to identify 
employees that are more likely to be unavailable to work during a 
pandemic.216   
The EEOC says that an “inquiry is not disability-related if it is 
designed to identify potential non-medical reasons for absence during a 
pandemic (e.g., curtailed public transportation) on an equal footing with 
 
 209 Id.  
 210 Id.  
 211 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 212 Id.  
 213 Id.   
 214 Id.   
 215 Id.   
 216 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
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medical reasons (e.g., chronic illnesses that increase the risk of 
complications).”217  The EEOC suggests that such inquiries should be 
“structured so that the employee gives one answer of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the 
whole question without specifying the factor(s) that apply.”218  As an 
example, the EEOC provides a pre-pandemic employee survey with the 
question being simply: “[i]n the event of a pandemic, would you be 
unable to come to work because of any one of the following reasons”; 
the survey then lists day-care center closures, care for dependents, 
public transportation disruptions, and/or high-risk medical conditions.  
The employee then answers simply “yes” or “no” without specifying 
which reason applies, so that the employer theoretically has not 
gathered any disability-related information.219  If an employee 
voluntarily discloses medical conditions or disabilities that increase his 
or her risk of influenza complications, “[t]he employer may ask him to 
describe the type of assistance he thinks will be needed (e.g. telework 
or leave for a medical appointment)” and must “keep this information 
confidential.”220   
In addition, as noted above, employers may be able to ask 
disability-related questions of an employee if the inquiry is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity; the employer also must have a 
reasonable belief based on objective evidence that the impairment will 
impede the employee’s ability to perform the job’s essential functions.  
In addition, the employer can ask disability-related questions if the 
employee may impose a direct threat (see below), as long as the 
information is kept confidential and maintained in a confidential 
medical record.  Once an influenza pandemic becomes severe or serious 
(according to public health officials), the employer “may have sufficient 
objective information from public health advisories to reasonably 
conclude that employees will face a direct threat if they contract 
pandemic influenza,” and “[o]nly in this circumstance may . . . employers 
make disability-related inquiries or require medical examinations of 
asymptomatic employees to identify those at higher risk of influenza 
complications.”221  The EEOC also notes that an inquiry about an 
employee’s exposure to pandemic influenza during travel is not a 
disability-related inquiry during an influenza pandemic.222 
 
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 Id.  
 220 Id.   
 221 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 222 Id. 
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2.  Medical Examinations 
The ADA permits examination of employees under certain 
circumstances.  Employers may require medical examinations as 
“fitness for duty exams” (or periodic physicals) “when there is a need to 
determine whether an employee is still able to perform the essential 
functions of his or her job,” so long as the physicals are job-related and 
consistent with business necessity. 223  This provision allows employers 
to make determinations necessary to the reasonable accommodation 
process described below.224  The information gathered “is to be treated 
as a confidential medical record.”225 
According to the EEOC, “a ‘medical examination’ is a procedure or 
test that seeks information about an individual’s physical or mental 
impairments or health.”226  Factors such as “whether the test involves 
the use of medical equipment,” “whether it is invasive,” “whether it is 
designed to reveal the existence of a physical or mental impairment,” 
and “whether it is given or interpreted by a medical professional” are 
used to determine whether the procedure is a “medical examination.”227 
Employment entrance examinations are permitted after a 
conditional offer of employment and before the employee starts work, 
and the “employer may condition the offer of employment upon the 
results of the examination[,]” as long as all entering employees in the 
same job category get the same exam and the confidentiality 
requirements are met.228  “[E]xclusionary criteria must not . . . tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability[,] . . . or they must be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”229  In addition, for 
exclusionary criteria, the “employer must also demonstrate that there is 
no reasonable accommodation [(discussed below)] that will enable the 
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the 
job.”230 
For example, “an employer in the international shipping industry” 
with much of its business in areas affected by an influenza pandemic 
could conduct “post-offer medical examinations for all entering 
international pilots and flight crew” that “include procedures to identify 
medical conditions that the CDC associates with an increased risk of 
 
 223 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(c) (2019). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11. 
 227 Id. 
 228 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.14(b) (2018). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:05 PM 
2020] COVID-19 AND THE ADA 417 
complications from influenza[,]” as long as these medical examinations 
are given to “all entering employees in the same job categories.”231  
Based on the EEOC example, similar post-offer medical examinations on 
those same terms could likely be performed to screen for risk factors for 
COVID-19 complications if the job poses the risk of COVID-19 exposure.  
If the examination reveals that the “applicant would pose a direct threat” 
to himself or others “within the meaning of the ADA” and a reasonable 
accommodation cannot be made without undue hardship, then the job 
offer may possibly be rescinded.232  Direct threats are discussed at 
length below. 
Measuring employees’ body temperatures will be considered a 
medical examination under the ADA.  The EEOC notes that if pandemic 
influenza becomes more severe or more widespread, “then employers 
may measure employees’ body temperature” (presumably with the least 
invasive method).233  On March 20, 2020, the EEOC stated that 
“[b]ecause the CDC and state/local health authorities have 
acknowledged community spread of COVID-19 and issued attendant 
precautions[,] . . . employers may measure employees’ body 
temperature[s]” and added that “[a]s with all medical information, the 
fact that an employee had a fever or other symptoms would be subject 
to ADA confidentiality requirements.”234 
The EEOC also notes that during a pandemic, employers, under the 
ADA, can (1) “encourage employees to telework . . . as an infection 
control strategy” (and employees at risk can request telework as a 
reasonable accommodation); (2) require “employees to adopt infection-
control practices” like regular handwashing at the workplace; and (3) 
require “employees to wear personal protective equipment” like face 
masks and gloves.235  The EEOC notes, however, that employers during 
a pandemic cannot require all employees to take a vaccine regardless of 
their medical condition or religious beliefs—unless this reasonable 
accommodation would cause undue hardship.236  Employers can also 
ask why an individual did not report to work because this is “not a 
disability-related inquiry,” and employers are “always entitled to know 
why an employee has not reported for work.”237  Employers may require 
employees who have been away from the workplace to provide a 
 
 231 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11. 
 237 Id. 
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doctor’s note certifying fitness to return to work; the EEOC notes that 
such inquiries are either not disability related or, if the pandemic is 
severe, justified under ADA standards.238 
Some inquiries and examinations will be necessary for employers 
to follow CDC recommendations for COVID-19.  The CDC has 
recommended that employers (1) actively encourage sick employees to 
stay home by using flexible sick leave policies and not requiring a 
doctor’s note, among other things; (2) separate sick employees upon 
arrival to work and send them home immediately; (3) “encourage hand 
hygiene”; (4) “advise employees if they must travel to take additional 
precautions” like checking for CDC guidance online, staying home if sick, 
and seeking appropriate medical care; and (5) discuss family situations 
with a supervisor to conduct a risk assessment if they have a family 
member with COVID-19.239  The CDC also recommends that the 
employer inform fellow employees of their possible exposure to COVID-
19, “but maintain confidentiality as required by the [ADA].”240  The EEOC 
has said that “[t]he ADA . . . do[es] not interfere with employers 
following advice from the CDC and public health authorities,” and 
“[e]mployers and employees should follow [such] guidance,” for what it 
is worth.241 
B.  “Qualified” and “Essential Functions” 
To be eligible for relief under the ADA, the individual must also 
show that they are “qualified”—in addition to fulfilling one of the three 
prongs defining “disability.”  With respect to an individual with a 
disability, “qualified” “means that the individual satisfies the requisite 
skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 
employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of such position.”242  Importantly for COVID-19, during the 
pandemic, a person “is not otherwise qualified if he poses a direct threat 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (May 2020), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-
response.html. 
 240 Id. (emphasis added). 
 241 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11. 
 242 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2018) (see § 1630.3 for exceptions to this definition). 
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to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 
accommodation.”243  Direct threats are discussed below. 
The ADA “prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability against 
a qualified individual.”244  Two steps are necessary to determine 
whether an individual with a disability is “qualified.”245  First, the 
individual must satisfy the prerequisites for the position, “such as 
possessing the appropriate educational background, employment 
experience, skills, licenses, etc.”246  Second, the individual must be able 
to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired, with or 
without reasonable accommodation.247  The determination of whether 
an individual is qualified should be “based on the capabilities of the 
individual with a disability at the time of the employment decision, and 
should not be based on speculation that the employee may become 
unable in the future or may cause increased health insurance premiums 
or workers compensation costs.”248 
The essential functions of a job are “those functions that the 
individual who holds the position must be able to perform unaided or 
with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation.”249  A non-
exhaustive list of factors considered in analyzing whether a function is 
essential include: (1) “whether the employer actually requires 
employees in the position to perform the function,” (2) “whether the 
position exists to perform a particular function,” (3) “the number of 
other employees available to perform that job function or among whom 
the performance of that job function can be distributed,” (4) “the degree 
of expertise or skill required to perform the function,” (5) “[t]he time 
spent performing the particular function,” and (6) “[t]he consequences 
of failing to require the employee to perform the function.” 250  “Written 
job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants 
for the job” are evidence to be considered, as are collective bargaining 
agreements and work experience of prior employees in that job. 251  As 
long as the employer can proffer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
for requiring particular levels of function (e.g., typing seventy-five 
 
 243 Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352–54 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d 
sub nom., Estate of Mauro By & Through Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 1998).  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)–(b). 
 244 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m).  
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. (emphasis added). 
 249 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(n) (2019). 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
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words per minute), the courts’ job is not to second guess those 
requirements.252  For COVID-19, the direct threat provision will have a 
lot to do with whether the individual is “qualified.”  See direct threat 
discussion below.   
C.  Reasonable Accommodations 
Under the ADA, employers are required to provide reasonable 
accommodation, absent undue hardship, to otherwise qualified 
individuals who are actually impaired or have a record of a disability but 
not to individuals “regarded as” disabled.253 
Generally, “an accommodation is any change in the work 
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an 
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment 
opportunities.”254  According to the EEOC, the three categories of 
reasonable accommodations are “(1) accommodations that are required 
to ensure equal opportunity in the application process; (2) 
accommodations that enable the employer’s employees with disabilities 
to perform the essential functions of the position held or desired; and 
(3) accommodations that enable the employer’s employees with 
disabilities to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are 
enjoyed by employees without disabilities.”255   
Examples of reasonable accommodations include, but are not 
limited to:  
(i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; 
reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or 
modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training 
materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters; and other similar accommodations for 
individuals with disabilities.256   
Other non-listed accommodations might include “use of accrued paid 
leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment, 
making employer-provided transportation accessible, and providing 
reserved parking spaces.”257   
 
 252 Id. 
 253 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §1630.2(o) (2019). 
 254 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §1630.2(o) (2019). 
 255 Id. 
 256 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2019). 
 257 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2019). 
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Employers should employ an “informal, interactive process with 
the individual with a disability” to “identify the precise limitations 
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations 
that could overcome those limitations.”258  Employers are not required 
to reallocate essential job functions to accommodate the employee.259  
Employers are also “not required to provide an accommodation that will 
impose an undue hardship on the operation” of the employer’s 
business.260  Undue hardship is defined as “significant difficulty or 
expense in, or resulting from, the provision of the accommodation” and 
includes “any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, 
substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature 
or operation of the business.”261  If one accommodation causes undue 
hardship, it just means that the “employer is not required to provide that 
accommodation”; however, the employer must still provide another 
accommodation that will not create undue hardship, if such an 
accommodation can be found.262 
For COVID-19, the EEOC has given at least one specific example of 
a reasonable accommodation: simply delaying the start date for an 
applicant who is found to have COVID-19 or symptoms of COVID-19 
after a conditional employment offer has been made.263  In another 
example, a reasonable accommodation for an employee with a “record 
of” a disability, like hospitalization for COVID-19, might be to grant 
“leave or a schedule change to permit him or her to attend follow-up or 
‘monitoring’ appointments from a health care provider.”264  Given the 
panic surrounding COVID-19, reasonable accommodations might 
include working from home due to fear of co-workers, leave time for 
fulfilling quarantine requirements, time off for follow-up medical 
appointments, and health department monitoring requirements.  The 
EEOC has added the following note to its website regarding reasonable 
accommodations during the COVID-19 pandemic:   
The rapid spread of COVID-19 has disrupted normal work 
routines and may have resulted in unexpected or increased 
requests for reasonable accommodation.  Although employers 
and employees should address these requests as soon as 
possible, the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 
pandemic may result in delay in discussing requests and in 
 
 258 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2019). 
 259 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2019). 
 260 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(p) (2019). 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. 
 263 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 264 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (2019). 
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providing accommodation where warranted.  Employers and 
employees are encouraged to use interim solutions to enable 
employees to keep working as much as possible.265  
Given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and the EEOC’s 
statement, it could be argued that some reasonable accommodations 
may create undue hardship during this particular timeframe.   
The CDC makes several recommendations for people who are at 
higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19 that may impact work and 
accommodation requests.266  For example, the CDC recommends that 
high-risk individuals “keep away from others who are sick,” “limit close 
contact and wash your hands often,” “avoid crowds,” “stay home as 
much as possible,” and avoid non-essential travel.267  To follow these 
CDC guidelines, high-risk employees may seek modifications to office 
space to allow for social distancing, the option of working from home, 
travel avoidance, and excuse from in-person meetings, among other 
accommodations. 
In contrast, employers are not required to provide “adjustments or 
modifications that are primarily for the personal benefit of the 
individual with a disability.”268  Job-related modifications “specifically 
assist[] the individual in performing the duties of a particular job” and 
are therefore considered reasonable accommodations. 269  Adjustments 
or modifications that assist the individual “throughout his or her daily 
activities, on and off the job,” are considered personal items that the 
employer is not required to provide.270  So, an employer “would 
generally not be required to provide an employee with a disability with 
a prosthetic limb, wheelchair, or eyeglasses.”271   
D.  Direct Threat 
Under the ADA, “an individual is not otherwise qualified if he poses 
a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated 
by reasonable accommodation.”272  The Supreme Court in Arline created 
 
 265 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11. 
 266 See CDC Higher Risk, supra note 167. 
 267 Id.   
 268 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2019). 
 269 Id.  
 270 Id.  
 271 Id.  
 272 Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352–54 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d 
sub nom. Estate of Mauro By & Through Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 1998); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(a)–(b) (42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) stating, “The 
term ‘direct threat’ means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot 
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D).   
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the direct threat exception, and “[f]ollowing that case, Congress 
amended the disability discrimination statutes to include the Court’s 
direct threat language.”273  The EEOC’s guidelines state that the “risk can 
only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, 
of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient.”274  The 
well-established “basic factors to be considered in conducting this 
inquiry” in the context of employing a person with a contagious disease 
are (1) “the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),” (2) “the 
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),” (3) “the severity 
of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties),” and (4) “the 
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying 
degrees of harm.” 275  According to the Supreme Court, the reasonable 
judgments of public health officials are given special deference.276  “If no 
accommodation exists that would either eliminate or reduce the risk, 
the employer may refuse to hire an applicant or may discharge an 
employee who poses a direct threat.”277   
One contagious infection, HIV, has gotten significant attention in 
the courts under the ADA with variable results.  Some courts follow a 
“cautious rule” that “a showing of a specific and theoretically sound 
means of possible transmission was enough” to constitute a “significant 
risk.” 278 
For example, the Mauro court found “as a matter of law, that [an 
HIV-infected surgical technician] has a contagious infection that poses a 
direct threat to the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated 
by reasonable accommodation” and granted the hospital summary 
 
 273 Doe v. Cty. of Ctr., Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 447 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 274 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(r) (2019). 
 275 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280–89 (1987) (citing an amicus 
brief of the AMA).  
 276 Id. (“In making these findings, courts normally should defer to the reasonable 
medical judgments of public health officials.”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 
(1998) (noting, “the views of public health authorities, such as the 
U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special 
weight and authority”).   
 277 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(r) (2019). 
 278 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating, “On one hand, 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have implicitly followed a cautious rule,” and 
explaining that in the “cautious circuits” small risks of HIV infection are considered 
significant where “a showing of a specific and theoretically sound means of possible 
transmission was enough to justify summary judgment against an HIV-positive plaintiff 
on the ground that the infection posed a ‘significant risk’ to others in the workplace, 
even though reported incidents of transmission were few or nonexistent, and the odds 
of transmission were admittedly small.”).   
GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:05 PM 
424 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:383 
judgment. 279  “Because there is a real possibility of transmission, 
however small, and because the consequence of transmission is 
invariably death, the threat to patient safety posed by the plaintiff’s 
presence in the operating room performing the functions of a surgical 
technician is direct and significant.”280  The court cited two other cases 
with nearly identical facts where an HIV surgeon and surgical tech were 
found to be direct threats and therefore not otherwise qualified.281   
The Mauro court analyzed the four factors as follows.  The court 
observed that an HIV-infected surgical technician whose essential 
duties required him to “place his hands upon and into the patient’s 
surgical incision” and “was always exposed during surgery to the 
possibility of sustaining a needle stick or minor laceration” (and had 
sustained two such injuries in his two years on the job) was a “direct 
threat”; the court reasoned that HIV “is a blood-borne pathogen that can 
be transmitted person-to-person by contact of infected blood with an 
open wound of another,” and HIV “causes AIDS, which is fatal, and for 
which there is no known cure.”282  The court added, further, “under the 
present state of medical knowledge, a person once infected with HIV 
remains infected for the rest of his or her life.” 283  The surgical tech 
unsuccessfully argued that “the probability of transmission is so slight 
as to overwhelm the first three factors.”284   
Similarly, a different court found that an orthopedic surgeon posed 
“a ‘direct threat’ to the health of his patients” as a result of his HIV-
positive status, and so the defendant hospitals did not violate the ADA 
by prohibiting performance of surgery without patients’ informed 
consent; the surgeon was “not ‘otherwise qualified’ to perform as an 
orthopedic surgeon” due to his HIV-infected status.285  The court 
analyzed the four factors and determined that while the other Arline 
factors were more certain, the exact probability of HIV transmission 
surgeon to patient reflected a “great deal of uncertainty” and was 
estimated at 1/40,000 to 1/400,000 by the plaintiff and 1/40,000 to 
1/150,000 by the defendant. 286  The duration of the risk was permanent 
 
 279 Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352–54 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d 
sub nom, Estate of Mauro By & Through Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 400, 
407 (6th Cir. 1998).   
 280 Mauro, 886 F. Supp. at 1353. 
 281 Id.  
 282 Id. at 1352. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 1353; Estate of Mauro By & Through Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 
398, 400–01 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 285 Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp. of Se. Pa., 887 F. Supp. 765, 771–72 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 286 Id. 
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where there was no known cure to HIV; the severity of the harm was 
fatal in most cases. 287  Using this analysis, the court found that the HIV-
positive orthopedic surgeon posed a direct threat.   
Similarly, a twelve-year-old boy’s HIV infection was found to pose 
a direct threat to other students in a traditional Japanese style martial 
arts school, justifying the school’s denial of admission where students 
engaged in “combat activity fighting,” sustained “consistently scratched 
skin, scratches, gouges, bloody lips, bloody noses, things of that nature,” 
and “no reasonable modification could sufficiently reduce the risk 
without fundamentally altering the nature of the program.”288   
In contrast, some courts approached HIV differently.  For example, 
the First Circuit found that the mere possibility of HIV transmission was 
not a significant risk and that a dentist “is not entitled to demand 
absolute safety.”289  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit found that “[i]t was an 
error to require that every theoretical possibility of harm be disproved” 
in another HIV case.290   
For COVID-19, based on the conflicting HIV cases, courts may 
deliver inconsistent findings across circuits where the risks associated 
with COVID-19 may be viewed differently.  For example, a 0.4% 
mortality risk may be viewed as “significant” in some courts, but not 
“significant” in others—especially given the politicization of the disease.   
The EEOC issued guidance on March 20, 2020, that says, “[b]ased 
on guidance of the CDC and public health authorities as of March 2020, 
the COVID-19 pandemic meets the direct threat standard.”291  The ADA 
does not define “COVID-19” the disease as a direct threat.  Instead, the 
ADA requires an individualized assessment to determine whether that 
particular person in that particular environment poses a direct threat 
based on current medical knowledge and the best available fact-specific, 
objective evidence.292   
The EEOC Guidance cites CDC and public health authorities’ 
acknowledgment of community spread of COVID-19 and their issuance 
of significant restrictions of public gatherings as reasons supporting its 
 
 287 Id. 
 288 Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 874–79 (4th Cir. 1999).   
 289 Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir 1997). 
 290 Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988).   
 291 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 292 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992) 
(citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)) (explaining that in order to 
protect “disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or 
unfounded fear,” an “individualized assessment” is required to  insure that “the 
determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others [is] 
not . . . based on generalizations or stereotypes”).   
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determination that the pandemic meets the direct threat standard, 
along with the fact that “numerous state and local authorities have 
issued closure orders for people together in close quarters due to the 
risk of contagion.”293  The EEOC then says, “These facts manifestly 
support a finding that a significant risk of substantial harm would be 
posed by having someone with COVID-19, or symptoms of it, present in 
the workplace at the current time.”294  Courts will similarly use public 
health authorities as preferred sources for current medical 
knowledge.295  The EEOC’s guidance also notes:   
The contents of this document do not have the force and effect 
of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This 
document is intended only to provide clarity to the public 
regarding existing requirements under the law or agency 
policies.296 
EEOC also notes that an employer may withdraw a job offer when an 
applicant needs to start immediately if the individual has COVID-19 
because “[b]ased on current CDC guidance, this individual cannot safely 
enter the workplace.”297   
But what if the job is a remote job working from home?  What about 
reasonable accommodations?  Even food handlers with diseases listed 
specifically as potential direct threats are entitled to consideration for 
reasonable accommodations.  HHS has a list of communicable diseases 
that are transmitted through food handling, and “[i]f an individual with 
a disability has one of the listed diseases and works in or applies for a 
position in food handling, the employer must determine whether there 
is a reasonable accommodation that will eliminate the risk of 
transmitting the disease through the handling of food.”298  Further, “[i]f 
there is an accommodation that will not pose an undue hardship, and 
that will prevent the transmission of the disease through the handling 
of food, the employer must provide the accommodation to the 
individual.”299  While the EEOC’s COVID-19 guidance will undoubtedly 
be influential, overly generalized policies based on COVID-19 
generalizations will likely be found unlawful by courts.  
 
 293 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
 294 Id. 
 295 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (noting, “the views 
of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National 
Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority”).   
 296 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11(emphasis added).   
 297 Id. 
 298 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(e) (2019). 
 299 Id.  
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In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that the Rehabilitation Act 
(after which the ADA was modeled) “is carefully structured to replace 
such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions 
based on reasoned and medically sound judgments.”300  The Supreme 
Court adds that  
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may 
pose a serious health threat to others under certain 
circumstances does not justify excluding from the coverage of 
the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious 
diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those accused of 
being contagious would never have the opportunity to have 
their condition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a 
determination made as to whether they were “otherwise 
qualified.” Rather, they would be vulnerable to discrimination 
on the basis of mythology—precisely the type of injury 
Congress sought to prevent.301   
Interestingly, the EEOC guidance failed to analyze the COVID-19 
direct threat issue using the four factors outlined by the Supreme Court 
in Arline.  Again, those well-established basic factors are (1) “the nature 
of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),” (2) “the duration of the risk 
(how long is the carrier infectious),” (3) “the severity of the risk (what 
is the potential harm to third parties),” and (4) “the probabilities the 
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.”302   
First, for COVID-19, the nature of the risk is mostly believed to be 
airborne transmission through person-to-person spread through close 
contact (within six feet) with an infected person (including those who 
are without symptoms).303  Second, the duration of the risk is likely 
related to the length of prolonged contact with another individual for 
more than ten minutes.304  Third, depending upon the details, the nature 
 
 300 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1987). 
 301 Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
 302 Id. at 287–88 (citing an amicus brief of the AMA).  
 303 How It Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html (hereinafter 
CDC How It Spreads) (explaining that the virus is spread “between people who are in 
close contact with one another (within about 6 feet)” and “through respiratory droplets 
produced when an infected person coughs, sneezes or talks”); Monica Gandhi, et al., 
Asymptomatic Transmission, the Achilles’ Heel of Current Strategies to Control COVID-19, 
382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2158, 2158 (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMe2009758 (noting that a “key factor in the transmissibility of Covid-19 is 
the high level of SARS-CoV-2 shedding in the upper respiratory tract, even among 
presymptomatic patients”).   
 304 Michael Klompas, et al., Universal Masking in Hospitals in the COVID-19 Era, 382 
NEW ENG. J. MED. e63(1), e63(1) (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM
p2006372 (noting that “public health authorities define a significant exposure to  
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and duration of the risk may be considered small in many situations.  
The severity of the risk, however, might be considered high in some 
courts.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “it is the potential 
gravity of the harm that imbues certain odds of an event with 
significance.”305  The court has explained that “when the adverse event 
is the contraction of a fatal disease, the risk of transmission can be 
significant even if the probability of transmission is low: death itself 
makes the risk ‘significant.’”306  Fourth, the probability that the disease 
will be transmitted will also be considered, which will include an 
analysis of whether reasonable accommodations can mitigate the risks.  
Aboard the contained cruise ship environment, Diamond Princess, 
approximately 19% became infected over a few weeks.307  A cruise ship, 
however, is a contained environment with potential for prolonged 
exposure, potential unique ventilation issues, etc. that will not apply to 
most work environments.  In addition, the probability of transmission 
may be significantly altered by following CDC guidelines, such as social 
distancing, frequent handwashing, minimizing prolonged contact, 
placing barriers between workers and patrons, and disinfecting 
surfaces regularly.308   
Using the four factors, COVID-19 may very well be a direct threat 
depending upon the individualized job circumstances.  As discussed 
earlier, the nature of the risk is one of close contact allowing 
transmission, with current recommendations to maintain “social 
distancing” of at least six feet.  The duration of the risk is not known for 
certain, but viral shedding was present in some of the patients for up to 
thirty-seven days in one study.309  The CDC, however, currently 
describes two durational strategies for return to work.  In its “test-based 
strategy” the CDC excludes workers until fever has resolved without 
medications, respiratory symptoms have improved (e.g., cough, 
shortness of breath), and two consecutive negative COVID-19 tests are 
 
Covid-19 as face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with symptomatic Covid-19 
that is sustained for at least a few minutes (and some say more than 10 minutes or even 
30 minutes)” and that the “chance of catching Covid-19 from a passing interaction in a 
public space is therefore minimal”). 
 305 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999).  
 306 Id.   
 307 Tina Saey, Cruise Ship Outbreak Helps Pin Down How Deadly the New Coronavirus 
Is, SCIENCENEWS (March 12, 2020), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-
outbreak-diamond-princess-cruise-ship-death-rate (noting that there were 3711 
people on Diamond Princess); Faust & del Rio, supra note 149, at 1046 (noting 712 
positive COVID-19 cases on the Diamond Princess).  Doing the math: 712 positive 
cases/3711 passengers = 19.2%.   
 308 CDC, How It Spreads, supra note 303.   
 309 Zhou et al., supra note 15, at 1054.   
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completed.310  The CDC’s “non-test-based strategy” excludes workers 
until at least 3 days (72 hours) “have passed since last fever without the 
use of fever-reducing medications,” “improvement in respiratory 
symptoms (e.g., cough, shortness of breath),” and “at least 7 days have 
passed since symptoms first appeared.”311  The potential harm to third 
parties is death since COVID-19 has a significant mortality rate 
discussed above depending upon age and comorbidities.  The 
probability that COVID-19 will be transmitted also appears to be fairly 
high given its rapid worldwide spread.  Therefore, based on the four-
factor analysis, good arguments can be made that COVID-19 in many 
employees and applicants will pose a direct threat to others—however, 
a fact-sensitive and individualized analysis may find that is not always 
the case depending upon the details of the situation and further medical 
developments.   
The fact that EEOC is calling COVID-19 the disease a “direct threat” 
does not alter the traditional individualized analysis of a plaintiff’s 
situation including the possibility of reasonable accommodation.  EEOC 
even notes, “[a]t such time as the CDC and state/local public health 
authorities revise their assessment of the spread and severity of COVID-
19, that could affect whether a direct threat still exists.”312   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The ADA will play a key role as Americans go back to work during 
and after the COVID-19 pandemic.  Fear, apprehension, and hysteria will 
likely affect employment decisions in the immediate aftermath of the 
COVID-19 outbreak.  COVID-19 has caused massive workplace 
disruptions with millions of Americans working from home, being laid-
off from work, not being hired, and otherwise disrupting the workplace.  
Most prior pandemics preceded the ADA, but the more recent SARS and 
swine flu pandemics help provide some insight.  In addition, cases 
related to communicable diseases like HIV and tuberculosis help 
provide some additional insight into how the courts will interpret the 
ADA for COVID-19.   
Some COVID-19 survivors will be considered “actually disabled” or 
having a “record of” disability due to the severity of their disease and 
physical sequelae.  But whether COVID-19 survivors with mild or 
 
 310 Criteria for Return to Work for Healthcare Personnel with Confirmed or Suspected 
COVID-19 (Interim Guidance), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/healthcare-facilities/hcp-return-
work.html.   
 311 Id. 
 312 EEOC, Pandemic Preparedness, supra note 11.   
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asymptomatic cases will receive protections under the ADA will depend 
upon how the morbidity and mortality of the disease compare with 
those of the common cold and seasonal flu and whether the “transitory 
and minor” exception of the “regarded as” prong applies.   
Balancing legitimate concerns of disease transmission and health 
risks with individual employee rights while avoiding discrimination 
based upon stereotypes or unfounded fears will be a challenge for 
employers as the COVID-19 outbreak resolves.  Employers will have to 
negotiate areas covered by the ADA including (1) inquiries and medical 
exams regarding COVID-19 during the hiring process and return to 
work, (2) reasonable accommodations for COVID-19 survivors, (3) 
evaluating the presence of a direct threat from a COVID-19 infected 
employee, and (4) accommodations for employees with special 
susceptibilities to severe COVID-19 complications.   
These issues are explored at length above with attention to EEOC, 
public health authority guidance, and relevant underlying statutory and 
case law.  In addition to the ADA, other laws and regulations ranging 
from OSHA313 to National Labor Relations Board regulations to state 
laws will also come into play.  As we learn more about COVID-19, the 
analysis will continue to evolve, but the ADA will play a key role for the 
next few years as employment discrimination allegations are likely to 
emerge from the pandemic COVID-19 outbreak in the United States.   
 
 
 313 Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf.  
